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REPORT
ON
BAIL AND OTHER PRE-TRIAL
RELEASE PROCEDURES
To the Board of Governors,
The City Club of Portland:
I. INTRODUCTION
A. AUTHORIZATION FOR STUDY
The authorization for the study assigned to this Committee was as follows:
"The Board of Governors hereby authorizes a study and report on
release procedures affecting accused persons before the courts of Oregon.
"The study should include, but not necessarily be limited to, practices
and procedures in the courts of Oregon, including the determination and
granting of bail to arrested persons, and the place of the professional
bondsman and the bail bond system, and the regulation thereof.
"The Committee may make such recommendations as it feels inclined
from its facts, findings and observations."
B. GEOGRAPHICAL AREA STUDIED
Your Commitee determined that it should limit its study to Multnomah County
and the City of Portland. However, although statistics will vary from one location
to another, it is believed that most of the findings, conclusions and recommenda-
tions contained in this report have general application throughout the state.
C. NATURE OF INVESTIGATION
Your Committee's study commenced concurrently with a similar study under-
taken by the Judicial Council of Oregon. Shortly after your Committee began its
work, the Judicial Council undertook a review of court records for the first six
months of 1965 of the Circuit and District Courts for Multnomah, Jackson,
Marion and Umatilla Counties and for the first three months of 1965 of the
Municipal Court of Portland. In each case studied, 23 questions were asked
relating to such matters as the crime alleged, the amount of bail posted, whether
a motion for reduction of bail was granted, whether the defendant was released
on personal recognizance (hereinafter sometimes referred to as R.O.R.)(1) or upon
posting of bail, jail time prior to release and from the time of arrest to the time
of final disposition of the case, whether counsel was hired or appointed, whether
the defendant appeared as required, whether the case was dismissed or resulted
in an acquittal or conviction upon trial or guilty plea, and the sentence resulting
in cases of conviction. <2> Your Committee felt that any similar attempt to review
court records would unnecessarily duplicate the Judicial Council's efforts. Its
investigation, therefore, consisted of interviews and correspondence with judges,
bail bondsmen, and representatives of law enforcement and prosecuting agencies
primarily in the Portland metropolitan area; a review of the statistics compiled
by the Judicial Council's study; a visit by the Committee's chairman to the Vera
Foundation in New York with an on-the-spot review of its program; attendance
by three members of the Committee at the 1967 Oregon Conference on Bail and
Criminal Justice, and a review of much of the literature on the subject. Although
the Judicial Council's study of court records has not been double-checked, the
Committee believes that the Council's report of December 1, 1966 accurately
reflects the situation in Oregon as of 1965.
0)"Release on personal recognizance" is a release of an accused, based upon his promise to
appear in court when specified, without being required to post bail.
(2)See Report of the Judicial Council of Oregon, December , 1966.
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In preparing its study, your Committee interviewed the following persons:
The Honorable Charles Redding, Alfred T. Sulmonetti, Robert E. Jones, Dean
Bryson and Jean L. Lewis, Judges of the Multnomah County Circuit Court,
each of the first two being the Presiding Judge of the Court at the time
of the interview;
The Honorable George Juba, Judge of the Multnomah County District Court,
previously with the United States Attorney's office and the Multnomah
County District Attorney's office;
The Honorable Edmund A. Jordan and Phillip Bagley, Judges of the Portland
Municipal Court;
Sidney I. Lezak, United States Attorney for the District of Oregon; and
Charles Habernigg, then Assistant U. S. Attorney in charge of pre-trial
criminal proceedings;
George Van Hoomissen, Multnomah County District Attorney;
Joe Levy, bail bondsman;
Chief Donald I. McNamara of the Portland Bureau of Police; and
James C. Holzman, Director, Department of Public Safety (Sheriff), Multnomah
County.
All of the persons interviewed were most cooperative and helpful.
II. HISTORY AND THEORY OF BAIL
Bail is the method our legal system has developed for attempting to assure
the appearance of an accused person at the time set for his trial, while releasing
him from physical custody in the interim. It is well established by decisions of the
U. S. Supreme Court that the only legitimate and lawful purpose of bail is to
ensure the presence of the accused at trial. "Bail set at a figure higher than an
amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is excessive under the Eighth
Amendment."'3*
The purpose of bail is so limited because of the fundamental Anglo-American
legal principle that an accused person is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Any attempt to utilize bail for other purposes, such as preventive detention or
suppression of political or social views, has been held improper.
The two principal theories concerning the origin of bail trace its development
to England. One traces the bail system to the ancient Anglo-Saxon practice of
hostageship, whereby one person was held hostage until a promise was fulfilled
by another. The other theory traces bail to the ancient practice relating to money
debts. Under this system, called "Wergeld," the creditor was assured by a third
party that he (the creditor) would get his money from the debtor. If the debtor
defaulted, then the third party was held responsible.
In their earlier stages, both systems operated on an exclusively personal basis,
and the State, or Crown, did not enter the picture until 1166, when it assumed
authority in all criminal cases. At that time the Crown, faced with the task of
administering justice, had to devise means to protect individuals who were im-
properly accused or innocent. The problem was further complicated by the frequent
inability of the judges to travel promptly to each place at which a trial was required.
As a result, bail was granted by bargaining with the sheriff with its accompanying
possibility of graft. In these cases, bail referred to a sum of money advanced by a
friend of the accused, in return for which the accused was delivered into the hands
of the friend. The arbitrary practices of the sheriff have since been reformed, but
the bail-surety relationship continues generally to be a personal one in England
today. <4>
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provided only that
"Excessive bail shall not be required."; but the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided
that "upon all arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be admitted except where the
punishment may be death * * * '\ Bail in capital cases was made discretionary.'5)
WStackv. Boyle, 342 US1, 72 SCt.l, 96 L.ed.3 (1951).
WRansom, Ronald Goldfarb, pp. 22-26: Bail in the Unite** States: '964, Free<1 and WpM,
p. 2.
(')Ibid.
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One of the principal differences between the American and English bail systems
is the use in America of the commercial bail bondsman. This development has
been attributed to the vastness of the territory we inhabit. In England, few
defendants were mobile enough to flee and, in addition, most bailed defendants
were known personally to the sheriff or Justice of the Peace. In the United States,
however, a wide frontier and the mobile nature of the population made necessary
a different technique to supplement the individual surety's personal guarantee to
produce the defendant. The result has been that until a very few years ago, pre-trial
release was in virtually all cases obtained, if at all, by the accused entering into a
commercial bail bond transaction.
Under our law the bail bondsman is, in effect, the custodian of the accused.
He has the right, if the accused should flee before trial, to track down and return
the accused to the jurisdiction of the court, whether or not his trail leads into the
next county or across state lines.'6'
In recent years, the controversy over the bail system has centered around the
institution of the bondsman and the widespread assumption that pre-trial release
can only be based on monetary bail, regardless of financial resources and without
consideration of other factors. Few social institutions so unquestioningly and
unanimously accepted for so long have become the subject of such sudden and
widespread concern for reform.
In Oregon, corporate bonding companies are regulated by the Insurance
Commission, but there is only one corporate bonding company now active. The
individual bondsmen, who dominate the business in this state, are regulated only
as to their personal financial responsibility.<7)
III. INEQUITIES IN THE BAIL SYSTEM
Awareness of the difficulties and inequities in the bail system is not entirely
new. One perceptive study was published in the 192O's.(81 A scholarly report,
based upon a study of some 1,700 felony cases in Multnomah County, was
published in the Oregon Law Review in 1932. (9) But apart from these isolated
examples, the inequities of this system were widely ignored until the early 1960's,
when a New York industrialist named Louis Schweitzer became outraged by the
injustice of the system then prevailing in New York. Through his efforts, the Vera
Foundation was established to study the bail system and propose reforms. Since
then, a vigorous movement to reform the bail system has developed.
It appears that the bail system discriminates against the poor and punishes
them for their poverty. An accused who cannot post bail, the amount of which is
traditionally set without regard to his financial means, remains in jail until his
day in court. A man who can afford bail remains at liberty.
An accused who remains in jail may be hampered in the preparation of his
defense, and this may adversely affect the outcome of his trial. While in jail, an
accused is unable to locate witnesses and otherwise assist in the investigation of
his case, and is under greater pressure to plead guilty in order to secure an earlier
disposition, especially where probation appears reasonably likely. Defense attorneys
generally believe that there is an adverse effect on the jury when an accused enters
the courtroom from the cell block, escorted by a law enforcement officer. And there
is, of course, substantial inconvenience to the accused's attorney if consultations
must be held in the jail. The 1963 report of the Attorney General's Committee
on Poverty and Administration of Federal Justice revealed that defendants detained
prior to trial pleaded guilty more often, secured less frequent acquittals and
dismissals, and were more likely to receive prison sentences than those freed on bail.
Consideration must also be given to disruption of an accused's employment and
familv relationships. An accused who cannot make bail may lose his job with
possible irreparable marring of his employment record. The accused's family is
(«)Reese v. U. $., 9 Wall., 13, 76 S.Ct. 541 (1870).
(7)ORS 140.120.
MThe Bail System in Chicago, A. L. Beeley (1927).
(?) Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice in Oregon, Morse and Beattie, 11 Oregon
Law Review, Supplement (1932). It is interesting to note that Recommendation 13 on page
117 of that report suggested the same type of investigation and gathering of information as is
now recommended by this Committee.
106 P O R T L A N D C I T Y C L U B B U L L E T I N
not only deprived of his normal earnings and companionship but also, if the
accused is the breadwinner, the family may be forced onto the relief rolls.
The literature reports that some magistrates candidly admit that they set high
bail to "break" crime waves, to cut a defendant off from his narcotic supply, to
make an example of a particularly abusive defendant, or to "make him serve some
time" even where an acquittal was a certainty. Many examples of such judicial
abuses were found in references cited in footnotes 10, 11 and 12 below.
The theory that bail serves solely to insure appearance for trial may be uni-
versally accepted by Appellate Courts, but it is clear that this standard is not
universally applied by bail-setting magistrates.
There are virtually insurmountable practical obstacles to challenging the
imposition of excessive bail. Appellate courts give broad discretion to lower court
judges in fixing the amount of bail. Even in cases where this discretion is clearly
abused, appellate court docket conditions generally prevent review before the
issue becomes moot. The result is that the conscience of the magistrate is, in effect,
the court of last resort. If he chooses to violate the constitutional mandate, no
effective review can be obtained.
Some authorities03* believe that "excessive bail" is a term which has not been
adequately defined. The question must be asked, "excessive for whom, and under
what circumstances?"
The setting of bail in a particular case, moreover, does not settle the terms
of release for the accused. The court's order can be defeated by the unwillingness
of a bondsman to provide bail, whether such unwillingness is for a good reason,
a bad reason, or for no reason. The professional bondsman has been referred to
by one commentator as "our jailer-at-large, or warden-without-portfolio."(14)
One argument often advanced by bail bondsmen in defense of the present
system is that the default rate is low. They also argue that the bondsman has
special ability and incentive to shepherd potential bond jumpers into court in
order to protect his investment. The opponents of the system argue, however,
that the reason for low defaults is that bail bondsmen only take the good risks—
who could be released on their own recognizance—and leave the bad risks in jail.
It is further contended that the bondsmen take only the good risks with money,
leaving the indigent good risks in jail along with the bad risks. The Committee
finds that this occurs in Oregon.
In some communities the bail bond practice has been infiltrated, supported
and sometimes run by the criminal element. Your Committee has seen no evidence
that this problem exists in this community.
IV. MISUSE OF BAIL FOR DETENTION PURPOSES
As previously stated, bail is intended solely to assure the appearance of an
accused at his trial. However, because there are not at present adequate means by
which a court can detain an accused who, it is felt, should not be allowed to go
free for reasons unrelated to the question of appearance at trial, courts have used
the setting of high bail to accomplish this purpose. For example, judges frequently
impose high bail to detain those whom they regard as dangerous to the community,
to themselves, or to others. Although there are statutes which permit the courts to
detain persons considered dangerous in certain specific limited situations, they
are inadequate to the general problem. ORS 426.510, for instance, provides for
the detention of persons sexually dangerous to children under twelve years of
age.<15) No provision is made for protection of other possible victims. ORS 426.215
provides for custody of a person believed to be dangerous to himself or other
persons, but only for five days. ORS 136.150 empowers a court to detain for up
(io)Bail in the United States: 1964, Freed and Wall, p. 41.
0 0 Joint Hearings on Federal Bail Procedures before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
and Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Committee of the Judi-
ciary, United States Senate, 88th Congress, Second Session, testimony of Hiram Fong,
Hawaii (1964).
02)Law in Transition Quarterly, V. II, No. 2, p. 111.
(13)C. Foote, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1031-79 (1954).
(^Missouri Bar Journal, January 1964, p. 13.
(i')ORS 426.570 provides for R.O.R. or bail for such potentially dangerous persons, however.
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to thirty days any defendant the court has reasonable grounds to believe is insane
or mentally defective to the extent that he is unable to understand the proceedings
against him or to assist in his defense, but here again this procedure has only
limited applicability.
Your Committee believes that special procedures should be devised and enacted
into law to permit the detention or supervision of extremely dangerous persons.
Although it is beyond the scope of this report to make comprehensive recommen-
dations for such procedures, the Committee believes that procedures can be worked
out within constitutional limits. The bail system ought not to be misused for
detention purposes.
V. THE BAIL SYSTEM IN OREGON
A. THE STATE SYSTEM
The Oregon Constitution, Article I, Section 14, provides:
"Offences (sic), except murder, and treason, shall be bailable by
sufficient sureties. Murder or treason shall not be bailable, when
the proof is evident, or the presumption strong * * *
Article I, Section 16, provides:
"Excessive bail shall not be required * * * "
In Oregon, if a defendant has been arrested without a warrant or under other
circumstances where the amount of bail has not previously been set, all magistrates
have the authority to admit him to bail. Magistrates include judges of the Supreme,
Circuit and District Courts, as well as county judges and justices of the peace.
Determination of the amount of bail is a matter within the sound discretion of the
magistrate and his decision will not be disturbed except in a clear case of abuse
of discretion.
In 1959 the Supreme Court of Oregon116» set forth the following ten factors
which magistrates should take into consideration when fixing bail:
(1) Ability of the accused to give bail;
(2) Nature of the offense;
(3) Penalty for the offense charged;
(4) Character and reputation of the accused;
(5) Health of the accused;
(6) Character and strength of the evidence;
(7) Probability of the accused appearing at trial;
(8) Forfeiture of other bonds;
(9) Whether the accused is under bond in other cases; and
(10) Whether the accused is a fugitive from justice when arrested.
Prior to 1965 there was no specific statutory authority for the release of a
defendant on his own recognizance. In 1965, the Oregon Legislature codified such
authority and further provided that if a defendant on R.O.R. willfully fails to
appear as directed by the court, such conduct constitutes an additional criminal
offense carrying a maximum penalty of two years in the penitentiary, if the original
charge was a felony, and a maximum penalty of one year in the county jail if the
original charge was a misdemeanor.(17)
Your Committee found the practice regarding the use of R.O.R. to vary
widely from one judge to another.
The following appeared to your Committee to be the general practices in the
various courts in the Portland metropolitan area relating to pre-trial release:
(1) In minor traffic offenses, the arresting officer designates the amount of
bail on the citation, taking the amount from a schedule provided him by the court.
The defendant is not taken into custody, but must later post the bail if he does
not wish to appear in court and contest the charge.
The arresting officer, however, has undefined discretion to take the defendant
into custody until bail is actually posted. Most courts will not accept personal
checks for bail. This discretion can be abused. An illustrative case reported to the
(^)Delaney v. Shobe, 218 Or 626, 346 P2d 126 (1959).
(i7)ORS 162-450.
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Committee involved a Portland resident who was married, employed, and a property
owner who had left his home in east Portland shortly after midnight to pick up
his nephew in Beaverton. Not anticipating any need for money, he had left his
home with only a few cents change in his pockets. In Beaverton, he was issued
a citation by a municipal police officer, charged with operating a motor vehicle
with expired license tags, and was advised by the officer that the scheduled bail
was $15.00. He was allowed to contact his wife and was then placed in a jail
cell for approximately two hours before arrangements could be made for $15.00
in cash to be brought out to the Beaverton Municipal jail.
(2) In major traffic offenses such as driving while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor, the defendant is usually taken into custody. If intoxicated,
he is incarcerated until deemed sober and then released if he can make bail or
qualifies for R.O.R. Recently, R.O.R. has been used more frequently because if
the defendant fails to appear in court, the court can then notify the Department
of Motor Vehicles to suspend the defendant's license.
This system sometimes produces absurd results. In one case in the City of
Portland, a husband and wife were arrested on charges arising out of the use of
alcohol; the husband was driving and his wife was a passenger. The husband was
charged with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and was
released on his own recognizance after being held for about two hours. The wife
was charged with being drunk in an automobile, was held until she was able to
post $100 bail, despite the fact that the charge against her husband was the
more serious of the two.
(3) Arrests on non-traffic misdemeanor charges require the posting of bail in
most instances, if the defendant wishes immediate release. Where the defendant
is arrested without a warrant, on being booked into jail he is notified by the police
officer as to the amount of bail from a schedule set by the court. If arrested
pursuant to a warrant, the court will have set bail for the specific case at the time
of the issuance of the warrant. In either case, the amount of bail is determined
by the charge alone; no other variables are considered. If the defendant is unable
to make bail, he must then remain in custody until the first opportunity to appear
before a magistrate, at which time he can request a reduction in bail or that he be
released on his own recognizance. Lower court judges do not routinely consider
reductions or recognizances on their own initiative and most unrepresented
defendants are not sophisticated enough to make such a request. This raises at
least three problems:
(a) The delay in bringing the defendant before a magistrate, particularly if
the defendant is arrested on a weekend;
(b) The absence of any facilities for the immediate gathering, verification and
presentation of pertinent facts to assist the magistrate in determining
whether or not the defendant should be released on his own recognizance;
and
(c) The absence, in most misdemeanor cases, of an attorney to properly present
to the court facts which might justify R.O.R.
At the present time there is no provision, under Oregon law, for appointment
of counsel for indigent misdemeanor defendants. However, Judge Alfred T.
Sulmonetti, presiding judge of Multnomah County Circuit Court, has recently
ruled that the United States Constitution requires the appointment of counsel
to represent indigents if the offense is punishable by imprisonment. That ruling
has been appealed by the Multnomah County District Attorney to the Oregon
Supreme Court .
(4) Arrests on felony charges almost always require the posting of bail, if the
defendant wishes immediate release. Again, the amount is determined solely by
the charged offense. If the defendant is arrested after being indicted, the court
will already have set bail. The District Attorney recommends the amount of initial
bail to the court at the time the grand jury returns the indictment, and the court
usually follows that recommendation. If arrested before indictment, the amount
of initial bail is determined by reference to a schedule.
It is evident to your Committee that there has been a growing awareness among
judicial officers and lawr enforcement agencies during the last few years of the
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inequities in the bail system. While it appears that since 1964 in Multnomah
County the trend has been toward more extensive use of R.O.R. by the judiciary
and a more lenient attitude by the District Attorney's office, it is equally evident
that some individual judges and prosecutors have been more reluctant than others
to follow that trend. One instance was reported just after the Committee had
interviewed the District Attorney, in which one of his deputies in District Court
had opposed releasing on recognizance a defendant who had substantial ties in
the community, for no apparent reason other than the fact that he thought all
defendants should have to post bail. This example made it clear that the District
Attorney should take steps to assure that his policy of liberalized pre-trial filters
down to the echelons in which it is most needed.
Because of crowded docket conditions and the absence of a formal procedure
to obtain facts relating to eligibility for R.O.R., some judges do not consider the
release question until the accused has an attorney to speak for him. This often
involves a delay of several days. Until better information-gathering procedures
are developed, the Committee believes that judges should make inquiries on their
own initiative directed to the release question.
B. THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
In 1966 Congress passed the Federal Bail Reform Act"8 ' which effected a
significant change in the approach to pre-trial release of defendants in Federal
courts. Prior to the Act, the burden was upon the defendant to show why he
should be released prior to trial without conditions. The Act shifts the burden
to the U. S. Attorney to show why the defendant should not be released without
conditions.
A fuller discussion of this Act is contained in Section VII (F) of this report.
VI. THE PROBLEM IN OREGON
Do the inequities discussed in Section III of this report exist in the State of
Oregon today? Your Committee finds that some do.
Based upon data developed by the Judicial Council study, your Committee
believes that the following conditions exist in Multnomah County:
1. The higher the bail, the more likely a defendant is to remain in jail pending
trial.
2. a. The longer the time spent in jail prior to trial, the greater the likelihood
of conviction.
b. Among those who are convicted, those who spend less time in jail before
trial more often received suspension of their sentences, or probation, than
their less fortunate counterparts.
c. In a small number of eases the time spent in jail prior to the disposition
of the case has exceeded six months.
(Undoubtedly there mav be other factors which contribute to the above
results. For example, there mav be a correlation between the previous
criminal record of an accused and the likelihood of his release or probation.)
3. In Multnomah County a small percentage of accused is released on their
own recognizance. This conclusion is based on the following:
a. In Portland Municipal Court, in the first three months of 1965, only
10 of a total of 458 accused were released on their own recognizance,
or 2.2 percent.
b. In Multnomah County District Court, in the first six months of 1965,
only 36 out of a total of 464 accused were released on their own
recognizance, or 7.7 per cent.
c. In Multnomah Comity Circuit Court:
(1) In the first six months of 1965, 47 out of a total of 453 accused
were released on their own recognizance, or 10.4 per cent.
(2) In 1967, 245 out of a total of 1,274 accused were released on
their own recognizance, or 19.2 per cent.
"8)18 USCA§ 3141 etseq.
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4. The use of R.O.R. could be substantially increased if the appropriate
information is made available to the court setting bail.
Sheriff Holzman advised your Committee that, as of February, 1968, of 475
persons in the Multnomah County Jail, 240 were awaiting trial. Of those 240,
42 had been in jail more than 90 days.
It should be observed that all felonies are prosecuted in the Circuit Court and
most misdemeanors and ordinance violations are prosecuted in the Municipal and
District Courts. It appears, therefore, that R.O.R. may be granted to a higher
percentage of defendants accused of the more serious offenses than to those
accused of the less serious offenses.
The attitudes of the representatives of the principal groups interviewed by
your Committee toward the bail system in Oregon might be summarized as follows:
1. The Judges: Some of the judges feel that the present system is working
well, but all agree that there is room for improvement. The judges feel that release
on one's own recognizance is used much more frequently now, particularly since
the Vera Foundation's work has been publicized, and some of the judges in
Multnomah County have taken a special interest in the problem.
One of the principal problems that seems to concern the judges setting bail
is the disposition of an accused who poses a risk either to himself, or others. The
judges are acutely aware of the law's failure to provide adequate legal means for
preventive detention of such people, and it is clear that when a judge believes
an accused poses a threat of danger either to himself or others, the judges are
inclined to set bail so high that it cannot be met. For example, a member of your
Committee recently observed a Circuit Court trial in which a man with deep roots
in the community and a clean record was accused of statutory rape of his step-
daughter. When the defendant's attorney moved for R.O.R., based on Stack v.
Boyle,(19> the judge announced that, regardless of that Supreme Court decision,
he would feel "derelict in his duty" if he failed to protect the defendant's family
by setting bail so high that it could not be met. The judges who misuse bail in
this way know that the purpose of bail is to assure an appearance at the trial and
not to protect society, but they feel that there are no other adequate procedures
for protecting society.
Some of the judges interviewed feel that the setting of bail is solely the
prerogative of the court, and for that reason resist giving non-judicial officers the
power to set bail or to release an accused on his own recognizance.
2. The Multnomah County District Attorney: Mr. George Van Hoomissen,
the Multnomah County District Attorney, indicated that he is personally in favor
of a liberal policy of releasing defendants on their own recognizance when justified.
He feels that if a pre-trial release program such as that used by the Vera Founda-
tion in New York is to be established in Oregon, the method of financing it should
be concurrently established. The District Attorney further suggested that at present
the bondsman does perform a service by assessing risk (whether or not an accused
should be bonded), keeping the accused advised of hearing dates, and insuring
that the accused is present.
3. Portland Bureau of Police, and Multnomah County Department of Safety:
The City of Portland Bureau of Police believes it can be of more use in the system
of pre-trial release if given greater responsibility, for example, to issue summons
in lieu of arrest in appropriate cases. Chief McNamara himself has urged legisla-
tion authorizing such a procedure. (See the discussion in Section VII, infra.)
Sheriff Holzman also favors liberalized pre-trial release procedures.
Both officers are acutely aware of the time spent in shepherding accuseds
between the bails and the courts.
4. The Bail Bondsmen: The Bail bondsmen believe that they perform two
essential services: One, getting the accused out of jail; and two, supervising the
accused to insure his appearance. They believe that their experience eminently
qualifies them to determine appropriate subjects for release on bail. The bondsmen
also argue that because of their network of contacts, coupled with their right to
go into other states and capture accused with methods that law enforcement officers
d»)Ibid. See Footnote 3.
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themselves cannot employ, the institution of bail bondsmen discourages bailed
persons from fleeing and provides for the recapture of bail jumpers without cost to
society. The bondsmen believe that despite the statistics gathered in the various
studies, persons released on recognizance have a higher rate of failure to appear.
It is not surprising to note that R.O.R., as well as other methods which do away
with the necessity of bail, are not regarded with favor by the bondsmen.
5. The Taxpayer: It is apparent that any system which would reduce the cost
of the administration of criminal justice and yet be consistent with the recognition
of civil rights would be desirable from a taxpayer viewpoint. Thus, to the extent
that any system can (a) reduce the time that policemen spend transporting prisoners
back and forth to jail and in court; (b) reduce the number of persons residing in
the jails; and (c) permit an accused to retain his freedom and continue his produc-
tivity prior to the time of trial without jeopardizing the administration of justice,
it should be employed over alternatives which do not achieve these goals as
successfully.
It is clear that the bail system in Oregon relies heavily on the bail bondsman,
an individual whose interests are primarily pecuniary, to determine whether an
accused for whom bail has been set will be released. In lower courts, where most
defendants do not have attorneys, the bondsman gathers the information necessary
to determine for himself whether or not an accused is or is not a good risk. Because
different bail bondsmen have different criteria, there are no uniform, objective
criteria for the determination of the proper subjects for pre-trial release by bail.
While this reliance upon bondsmen by the courts is, initially, without cost to
society, the final cost to society and to the accused may be much greater than other
alternative systems that allow more persons to be free prior to the time of their trial.
Your Committee feels that the present system of bail in Oregon is to a large
extent tradition-bound and channeled in approach. It feels that there are numerous
ways in which the system can be improved, both within the existing framework
and by the adoption of alternatives. It further feels that all the responsible govern-
mental and judicial agencies, with the apparent exception of the majority of
Oregon's Senate Judiciary Committee, are receptive to proposed changes and would
gladly implement any programs established to better deal with the problems.
VII. ALTERNATIVES
Your Committee has considered several possible alternatives to the present
system of pre-trial release.
A. RELEASE EVERYBODY
It has been seriously contended by Professor Caleb Foote, among others, that
everyone accused of crime should be released, at least experimentally, conditioned
only upon his promise to appear for trial. Jails would then be penal institutions
exclusively. There would be no detention of any accused person until he had been
adjudicated guilty.
The success of such an approach might indeed be surprising. It would have
several advantages:
1. It avoids the irony of imprisoning a person whom the law commands us
to presume innocent, thereby subjecting him to the same punishment as convicted
offenders.
2. It avoids the misclassification of good risks as bad, and of bad risks as good.
3. The economic savings in both the public and private sectors would be
enormous. Costs of pre-trial detention cannot be precisely determined, but the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice has
estimated that pre-trial detention costs state and local governments well over $100
million each year in jail costs alone.{20) The Vera Foundation found that in New
York City in 1962, approximately 1,800,000 man-days were spent in pre-trial
(20) President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Criminal Justice, Task
Force Report: The Courts, G.P.O. (1967) p. 38.
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detention, at a cost of over $6 per man-day, making the cost to that city alone
more than $10 million per year.*21'
4. As previously mentioned, jail expense is only one of the costs which the
community must pay for pre-trial detention. The accused may have a job and
dependents, in which case detention will frequently result in loss of employment,
repossession of the family's household goods and other property, and accumulation
of debts. Many such families will require public welfare support or aid to dependent
children. Tax revenues are lost to the public treasury, and the accused may be
deprived of his financial ability to retain legal counsel which he then either does
without or obtains at public expense.
5. It would avoid the indiscriminate mixing of detainees with convicted
offenders in our jails which, as Justice William O. Douglas has observed, is
frequently "equivalent to giving a young man an M.A. in crime,'22' with incal-
culable future costs to society."
The serious personal consequences of pre-trial detention to the accused must
not be overlooked. These seem particularly harsh when his case ends in dismissal
or acquittal, or when upon conviction he is found to be entitled to a suspended
sentence and probation. In the federal courts in 1963, for example, 22,340
persons were detained before trial, but only 13,600 were later sentenced to
prison/23 '
Despite all of these advantages of completely abolishing pre-trial detention, there
are two disadvantages which, together, account for the probable unacceptability of
this alternative.
1. Some who might be released are dangerous to society and would commit
further crimes while awaiting trial. The prospect of this could cause disrespect for
the judicial system among the general public.
Your Committee does not feel that this objective is persuasive, inasmuch as
other procedures should be utilized or developed for the handling of persons whose
danger to the community is obvious and great.
2. A certain number of those released would frustrate society's efforts to bring
them to justice by running way.
The risk of larger numbers of runaways constitutes the principal problem
with respect to the wholesale release of all persons accused of crimes. Several
questions are then raised: What is a tolerable percentage of runaways? If everybody
were released, would the tolerable loss rate be exceeded? If so, by how much?
And what percentage of persons can be released without exceeding the tolerable
loss rate?
Fortunately, we are not without some guidance on these matters. Appendix A
to this report is a table which originally appeared in Bail and Summons: 1965.
It is a report of the proceedings of the Institute on the Operation of Pre-Trial
Release Projects held in New York City, October 14-15, 1965. It provides an
interesting summary of information gathered from bail and R.O.R. projects around
the country. Your Committee has added a column of its own to Appendix A
showing the percentage of those shown as released on recognizance who failed to
appear.
One general conclusion that may be drawn from a comparison of these figures
is that there is no significant relationship between the percentage of accused
persons released on their own recognizance and the percentage of those released
who failed to appear, at least up to the point at which about 80 per cent of those
accused are released. Indeed, some of those courts releasing the largest percentages
of people on R.O.R. have the most favorable rates of appearance. For example, in
Denver, Colorado, 75 per cent were released and 1.9 per cent failed to appear;
in New York City 82 per cent were released and 1.2 per cent failed to appear;
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appear. The projects in all of these cities included felonies as well as misdemeanors.
The courts of some other cities were experiencing much worse loss ratios while
releasing far fewer people. For example, in Atlanta only 19 per cent were released,
but 4.3 per cent of those failed to appear.
Your Committe concludes from this information that the success of a release
program will depend more upon the reliability of its information-gathering
processes and the validity of its predictive techniques than upon the limits within
which it is administered. Appendix A suggests that it is possible to release up to
80 per cent of all persons accused of felonies and misdemeanors without substantial
risk. The Vera Foundation suggests that if more than 25 per cent of persons accused
of all crimes remain in jail, that community has a bail problem. Your Committee
is not prepared to state what percentage of accused persons in Oregon courts
should be released, but it is confident that the utilization of an immediate infor-
mation-gathering process will permit our courts to release on recognizance a
substantialh greater number of persons than they have been able to release under
the present system.
Since your Committee feels that there will continue to be certain persons the
risk of whose flight, if released, is great, it docs not feel that releasing everybody
is a feasible alternative at this time. It does feel, however, that the release of all
persons accused of a crime until their guilt is determind in court is a goal which
society should strive to achieve to the extent that it is consistent with the orderly
administration of justice and society's self-preservation.
B. SUMMONS IN LiEU OF ARREST
This alternative involves the service of a summons, or citation, to appear in
court at a given time, upon an accused person by a police officer in place of the
traditional arrest. This procedure is presently followed in most traffic cases under
ORS Chapter 484. House Bill 1526 (Appendix D) in the 1967 Oregon Legislature,
if it had been enacted, would have permitted police officers to employ the same
procedure with respect to all criminal charges except those which are not consti-
tutionally bailable.
Other jurisdictions have had excellent success with the use of the summons.
The outstanding example of which the Committee is aware is the system used
extensively in Contra Costa County, California. Contra Costa police now issue
summonses in lieu of arrest in over half of all misdemeanor cases, and they enjoy
an appearance rate of 99 per cent. The law enforcement officers of that county
are eager to extend the system to most felony cases and believe it is justified on
the grounds of police efficiency and economy alone.
Both District Attorney George Van Hoomissen of Multnomah County and Chief
Donald I. McNamara of the City of Portland Bureau of Police are strongly in favor
of the implementation of a summons program in this area. The only opposition
seems to come from the City Attorney's office and from some judges of the
Municipal Court.
The advantages of the summons in lieu of arrest are many and substantial.
L'sing a summons avoids the serious deprivation of personal liberty which results
from arrest, transportation to the police station, booking and detention for anywhere
from a few hours to several da\s before a judicial determination regarding pre-trial
release can be made. It results in substantial economics, including reduction in
custody time and expense, elimination of transportation requirements and fuller
utilization of law enforcement equipment and personnel for actual law enforcement
rather than custodial activities. And it can effect a significant improvement of
police relationships with members of the community.
One problem which has been raised has to do with acceptance of the summons
procedure by the public, bv law enforcement personnel, and by the courts.
Experience in other projects has shown that public acceptance is not a problem.
Police officers are sometimes—because of their traditions and training—reluctant
to make wide use of the summons at first, but again, experience has shown that
thev use it more and more extensively as the advantages to law enforcement become
evident and as they come to realize that the persons to whom they issue summonses
in lieu of arrest are not thereby escaping justice.
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Some municipal judges of Portland oppose the summons in lieu of arrest on
the ground that this would be, in effect, permitting police officers to "recog" accused
persons, and that this is a "judicial prerogative." Your Committee does not believe
that making the initial decision as to whether an accused is released or held is a
judicial prerogative. Pre-trial release decisions are not part of the adjudicative
process. The Committee is not persuaded by the attitude of the municipal judges,
believing that the judiciary need only become involved when an accused is not
released. In many cases the police can make an equally sound determination,
thereby relieving themselves of transportation burdens and the already overburdened
courts of time-consuming procedures aimed at release decisions.
House Bill 1526 was introduced in the 1967 Oregon Legislature as a direct
result of the 1967 Oregon Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice. It was passed
by the House of Representatives, with no substantial opposition, by a vote of 50
to 6. In committee hearings it was supported almost unanimously by all persons
interested in the problem, including law enforcement personnel.
Unfortunately, the bill suffered the fate of much reform legislation which is
referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee—it died there. After the end of the
session, a member of your Committee called Senator Thomas Mahoney, chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, to seek his comments on the demise of this
important bill, but Senator Mahoney refused even to discuss the matter.
C. STATIONHOUSE RELEASE
Even if a summons is available, in some cases the officer will justifiably conclude
that an arrest is necessary. He may determine that identification, booking, search,
questioning, fingerprinting and photographing are called for, or he may, for any
of a variety of reasons, feel that the accused presents a marginal risk of flight.
Stationhouse release is a method of releasing persons to whom a summons has
been denied and who have therefore been arrested and taken to the stationhouse.
After identification, booking, etc., the desk sergeant or another officer to whom the
authority is delegated reviews the release question. He may either issue a summons
at that time, or decide that security for appearance or a judicial hearing should
be required.
The outstanding stationhouse release program in current operation is the
Manhattan Summons Project, initiated in New York on April 1, 1964. On May
2 5, 1966, Police Commissioner Howard R. Lean reported as follows:
"The Vera recommendations have been accepted by our desk
officers in more than 99 per cent of the cases and of the first 1,000
summonsees, only 22 failed to appear at the initial court hearing.
This is a skip rate of only 2.2 per cent. Furthermore, 99 per cent
of those summonsees who have returned to court were subsequently
released on their own recognizance by the judge after their first
court appearance."(24)
Your Committee believes that individualized determinations should replace
the offense-related bail schedules presently in use in our stationhouses. Clear
authority should be invested in someone at all times, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week,
in each precinct to make these decisions, and each time an accused is brought in,
the release question should be considered as a matter of course. There should be
adequate staff to handle the task of interviewing and obtaining information about
the accused. For this purpose, a simple printed questionnaire would be helpful.
The Multnomah Count} Circuit Court now utilizes a motion for reduction of bail
which requires the basic information that such a questionnaire would elicit.
(Appendix C)
D. TEN PER CENT DEPOSIT
In 1963, the Illinois Legislature enacted a statute providing that the accused
could obtain his release by depositing ten per cent of the amount of bail with the
Clerk of the Court. Previously in Illinois, as in Oregon, the accused had either
to raise the entire amount in cash or to pay a premium (usually ten per cent—
nonrefundable, of course) to a professional bondsman. The ten per cent deposit
(24)Remarks at Judicial Conference, District of Columbia Circuit, Washington, D. C , May 25,
1966.
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procedure obviates either necessity. If he appears in court at the appointed time,
90 per cent of his ten per cent deposit is returned to him. This means that his
liberty costs him only one per cent of the original amount of bail to cover admini-
strative costs.
The question has been raised as to whether the use of a ten per cent deposit
should be mandatory upon, or discretionary with, the bail-setting authority. When
mandatory, criticism has been made that the setting of bail then becomes a game
of figures whereby the bail set is actually ten times the amount of bail desired. For
this reason, your Committee feels that the ten per cent deposit system should be
mandatory only for certain minor offenses, but discretionary for the balance of
offenses. For those offenses for which it is mandatory, it should be immediately
available to all persons for whom stationhouse release has been denied.
The advantages of the ten per cent system are:
1. The incentive to appear is far greater if the accused is going to have all or
most of his deposit refunded. When a bond is posted, the accused gains nothing
by appearing, and if he does not appear, the financial loss usually falls upon the
bondsman rather than the accused unless the security has been pledged on behalf
of the accused. In fact, the accused probably cares very little whether the bonds-
man has to forfeit a bond, as his premium is already "money down the drain."
2. It is convenient. The accused can make his ten per cent deposit at a
conveniently located window inside the stationhouse.
3. No security would be required. Frequently the primary obstacle to obtaining
a release upon bond is not the inability to raise the premium, but the inability to
furnish the additional security (such as mortgages, cash deposits, co-signers, etc.)
which is often required by the bondsmen.
One of the arguments aaginst such a system is the additional cost, personnel
and administrative burdens said to be imposed upon the courts. Your Committee
feels that this argument is not persuasive. First, the costs and administrative burdens
would be quite small. Second, any such additional burdens are proper costs of the
public administration of justice, and should be borne willingly.
The bail bondsmen in Illinois lobbied against legislation authorizing the system
because they feared that it would put them out of business. Putting the bondsmen
out of business was not only an inevitable effect but to some extent a purpose of
the Illinois act.
Bondsmen and other opponents object that persons released under this system
will be less reliable because they will not be subject to the supervision of the
bondsmen, and that law enforcement will then assume the burden of recapturing
runaways, which burden is now efficiently handled by the bondsmen.
Your Committee does not find these arguments persuasive for the following
reasons:
1. The supervision of accused persons, where required to deter flight, and
the recapture of those who have fled, are legitimate and proper functions of public
law enforcement agencies, and no reason is perceived for delegating or abdicating
th^m to private enterprise.
2. The experience in Illinois belies the bondmen's outcry. In a survey covering
35,571 surety bonds and 27,956 deposits under the ten per cent system, the rate
of surety bond forfeitures was fifty per cent greater than the rate of deposit
forfeitures.'25'
The question remains how the amount of bail deposit should be determined,
by whom, and upon vhat criteria. Bail determinations are presently made exclu-
sively by the courts. Ordinarily, a schedule is maintained for the preliminary setting
of bail which is strictly offense-related. This is a necessary point of departure
because very seldom is anything known about the accused personally at the time
of his arrest.
It is believed that too often the charged offense is the principal criterion in
determining what bail, if any, should be required. The Committee believes that
(2')Bowman, The Illinois Ten Per Cent Bail Deposit Provision, University of Illinois Law
Forum, Spring 1965, p. 39.
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considerable weight should be given to personal factors and ties to the community.
Your Committee sees no good reason why these determinations cannot be made as
effectively by non-judicial personnel as by judges, especially since they can be
subject to judicial review.
The Committee believes that for cases in which ten per cent deposit is
authorized, the public should bear the administrative cost and that all of the deposit
should be returned to the accused when he appears for trial.
E. RELEASE ON RECOGNIZANCE BY COURT
If the accused is still in custody after the precinct officer has set bail, he should
be taken immediately before a magistrate who should consider whether or not he
should be released on his own recognizance. To this end, the Court should have
sufficient clerical staff for accumulating and verifying information about the
accused, and, to the greatest extent possible, this information should be made
available to the court before the accused's first appearance so that the judge need
not "start from scratch."
The Committee's observation is that R.O.R. is not as widely used in the
Portland metropolitan area as it ought to be, although a number of the judges
interviewed by the Committee strongly favored its wide use as a matter of policy.
The Committee is confident that the failure of our courts to use R.O.R. more
frequently is attributable not to opposition to its use, but to the lack of information
about the accused sufficient to make a proper determination, coupled with the
crowded docket conditions.
There are two schools of thought regarding the criteria for release on recogni-
zance. (26) The subjective school believes just what the name implies—that the
officer or judge making the decision will simply question the man and decide
whether he feels that he is a good risk. The objective system is a point system,
whereby the accused receives a certain number of points for certain kinds of family
ties, etc. If he has a certain number of points, he qualifies for R.O.R. If he does
not, bail or other conditions will be imposed. The Committee is not prepared to
recommend one system over the other, as both seem to work satisfactorily when well-
administered. The success or failure of a release system will inevitably depend more
upon the quality and attitudes of the people administering it than upon the precise
methodology employed.
If release on recognizance is denied, or if conditions are imposed which the
accused cannot meet, the judge should be required to set down in writing his
reasons for denying release. Then an immediate appeal for review by the next
higher court should be available. Furthermore, there should be a periodic review,
perhaps weekly, of all cases in which accused persons are still incarcerated pending
trial to determine whether there is any way of releasing them. These procedures
are provided in the federal system.
F. FEDERAL BAIL REFORM ACTION OF 1966
The Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966(27) constitutes the first significant
reform in pre-trial release procedures in the federal system since 1789. Its basic
purpose is to reverse the traditional presumption that a person must post bail in
order to gain his liberty pending trial. It creates a new presumption that he is
entitled to be released upon his promise to appear. If the Court determines that
the risk of such release is too great, then additional conditions may be imposed.
The judge may (in order of preference):
"(1) Place the person in the custody of a designated person or organization
agreeing to supervise him;
"(2) Place restrictions on the travel, association or place of abode of the
person during the period of release;
"(3) Require the execution of an appearance bond in a specified amount
and the deposit in the registry of the court, in cash or other security
as directed, of a sum not to exceed 10 per centum of the amount of
the bond, such deposit to be returned upon the performance of the
conditions of release;
(26>See Bail Summons: 1965, at p. 88, for a discussion of their relative merits.
(27)public Law 89, §§ 3146-3152.
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"(4) Require the execution of a bail bond with sufficient solvent sureties,
or the deposit of cash in lieu thereof; or
"(5) Impose any other conditions deemed reasonably necessary to assure
appearance as required, including a condition requiring that the
person return to custody after specified hours."
There is a provision for appeal from any adverse determination.
It will be observed that subsection (4) authorizes the requirement of a com-
mercial surety bond. It is too early to have much information on the practical
impact of this legislation in the federal system, but we do know that bail bonds
are still being required in some cases.
The Committee feels that the Federal Act would be used as a model for state
legislation. The Committee hopes that the Oregon Legislative Assembly will give
full consideration to bail reform at its next regular session and enact appropriate
legislation.
VIII. HANDLING OF THOSE REMAINING IN JAIL
There is still a problem remaining: What to do with those hopefully few
high-risk accused persons who do not obtain pre-trial release?
The problem, of course, can be lessened by expediting trials for all persons
who remain in detention so that pre-trial incarceration is minimized. The time for
which an accused person may be detained should be limited by statute.
Furthermore, the Committee strongly urges that separate detention facilities
be provided for those persons awaiting trial and for convicted offenders. Although
the Committee recognizes that security must be maintained in pre-trial detention
facilities, we remain seriously disturbed by the idea of incarceration in a jail-like
atmosphere—no less punishment than if a sentence were being executed—before
an adjudication of guilt. Therefore, such separate facilities should be as non-
prisonlike as possible, consistent with necessary security. Liberal visitation privileges
should be granted to members of the family and friends of the accused.
One of the serious consequences of pre-trial detention is the limitation upon
the ability of the accused to assist in the preparation of his defense. It deprives
him of the ability to consult freely with an attorney and to search for witnesses and
cooperate in the investigation. Therefore, the accused awaiting trial should be
afforded the most liberal opportunity to use the telephone and to consult with his
attorney and others in absolute privacy.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
1. The sole legitimate purpose of bail or any other conditions of pre-trial release
under our judicial system is to assure the appearance of the accused at the time
set for trial.
2. Because our judicial system has not developed adequate means for securing
preventive detention of dangerous or potentially dangerous persons, bail has been
misused for this purpose.
3. There are both social and economic disadvantages to pre-trial confinement.
Some of these disadvantages are:
(a) Incarceration is not consistent with the presumption of innocence.
(b) Jailing the accused results in his separation from his family and employ-
ment, in some cases causing loss of job and the placing of his dependents
on public welfare.
(c) Confinement reduces the accused's ability to pay legal counsel of his own
choice.
(d) Confinement reduces opportunity to assist in the preparation of his defense.
(e) Confinement forces the accused to co-mingle with seasoned or convicted
criminals.
(f) Confinement increases the likelihood and extent of the alienation of the
accused from society.
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(g) There are substantial costs to the community in maintaining detention
facilities and the personnel to operate them.
(h) Confinement often results in an accused spending time in jail as if he were
a criminal, when the ultimate disposition of the case results in his probation
or acquittal.
(i) Confinement, when it is conditioned on financial ability, discriminates
against the poor.
4. For the reasons explained in Paragraph 3, the pre-trial release of the
maximum numbers of persons with a minimum of monetary conditions consistent
with the reasonable expectation of appearance at trial is desirable.
5. Certain factors have been found to be relatively reliable indices for deter-
mining the likelihood that a person released on his promise to appear at trial will
do so. Among these are:
(a) Nature and length of employment.
(b) Family and community ties.
(c) Past pre-trial release experience.
6. Maximum utilization of pre-trial release depends upon the availability
of reliable information regarding the factors described in Paragraph 5.
7. In the last several years there has been increasing awareness of and use by
the courts in the Portland metropolitan area of release on personal recognizance,
but these courts, particularly the municipal courts, have been limited in their ability
to make full and early use of release on recognizance because of crowded docket
conditions and the lack of fact-finding procedures and personnel to obtain infor-
mation prerequisite to a determination of eligibility for such release.
8. The bail bondsmen in the Portland metropolitan area continue to play a
major role in pre-trial release procedures.
9. The Portland metropolitan area is lagging in the development and imple-
mentation of effective pre-trial release procedures.
10. A receptive attitude toward modernized and more liberal pre-trial release
procedures prevails among the law enforcement and judicial officers in this area.
X. RECOMMENDATIONS
Your Committee submits the following recommendations pertaining to policies
regarding bail bonding and release procedures:
1. Summons in Lieu of Arrest. Police officers should be given the power to
issue a summons or citation in lieu of arrest in certain classes of criminal cases.
Your Committee has not determined whether a police department has the authority
to establish such a procedure in the absence of legislation.
2. Stationhouse Release. In cases in which an arrest is made by an officer who
could have issued a summons, there should at all times be an officer at the station-
house with authority to issue a summons after making a standard investigation to
determine eligibility for the use of a summons and release from custody.
3. Ten Per Cent Cash Deposit. In cases in which stationhouse release is not
granted or is not applicable, the accused should be given the right, in certain minor
cases, to obtain his release by signing a personal bond for the amount of the
scheduled bail for the offense charged and posting with the clerk a cash deposit
of ten per cent thereof. The accused should then be entitled to a refund of his cash
deposit if he complies with all court orders for his appearance. For the remainder
of offenses, the right to deposit ten per cent of the bail should be discretionary
with the bail-setting authority.
4. Interview and Investigation. If the accused is still in custody at this point,
he should immediately be interviewed in order to obtain and verify information
regarding his community ties, etc. This information should be submited to a
magistrate as soon as it is available.
5. Investigation Staff. A position should be created and filled to perform the
interview and investigation described in Recommendation No. 4.
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6. Immediate Review by Court of Eligibility for Release. As promptly as
possible, an accused still in custody should be taken before a magistrate. The
magistrate should on his own initiative, and in all cases, and whether or not the
information provided pursuant to Recommendation No. 4 is available, review the
question of the accused's eligibility for release.
7. Establishment of Night and Weekend Courts. To avoid the delay of up to
three days which can now occur between the time of arrest and judicial review of
release eligibility, daily, nightly and weekend sessions of the appropriate courts
should be established.
8. Justification of Bail Conditions. Legislation should be enacted to require
the judge, in cases in which R.O.R. is denied and conditions are imposed which the
accused cannot meet, to state in writing his reasons for imposing the conditions.
9. Immediate Appeal. Provision should be made for expeditious appeal to the
next higher court for review of any condition of release which is not or cannot
be met.
10. Periodic Review. The court should periodically review all cases in which
accused persons remain in custody pending trial to determine if there is any
reasonable basis upon which they can be released from custody pending trial.
11. Segregation of Convicted Offenders from Accused Persons. Provisions
should be made for physical segregation of convicted offenders from persons
awaiting trial.
12. Authorizing Preventive Detention. Courts should be authorized to detain
persons who are determined, by constitutional methods, to be dangerous to them-
selves or others.
13. Your Committee recommends that the Oregon Legislative Assembly enact
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IN THE COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
FOR THE COUNTY OF MULTNOMAH
THE STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff, ) No. C-
vs. • AGREEMENT AND RELEASE
Defendant.) ON RECOGNIZANCE
I, , in consideration
of being released upon my own recognizance in lieu of furnishing bail on the
charge of
do hereby agree that I will appear at all times and places as ordered by the Court
and as ordered by any Court where this charge may be prosecuted, and that I will
appear for trial and if convicted will appear for judgment and execution of
judgment.
I further agree that if I fail to so appear and am apprehended outside the
State of Oregon, I hereby waive extradition.
I understand that wilful failure to appear in accordance with this agreement





It appearing to the Court that good cause having been shown to release
defendant from custody upon his own recognizance, and in consideration of the
execution of the above agreement;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant herein named be released upon
his own recognizance in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agree-
ment set forth above.
Date
Judge
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APPENDIX C
MULTNOMAH COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT REDUCTION IN BAIL FORM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON





Defendant. M O T I O N




Defendant, being duly sworn, states the following information to be true and
correct:
True Name in Full Age
Residence Address- How long?
Telephone No ._ Soc. Sec. No
Previous Address How long?
Previous Address How long?











Occupation Street Address, City, State
Wife or Husband
Children
Do you own or rent your home?
Make & year of auto In whose name? ,
Amount owing -License, State & No
List all prior convitcions of crimes and ordinance violations, omitting minor traffic
offenses:
Offense When Where Disposition
Have you ever been charged with escape from custody?-
Have you ever been sought as a fugitive? . ._
(Signature of Defendant)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, this _dav of
DA No. 49
Form DA 37 3M 9/65
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR OREGON
My commission expires:
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HOUSE BILL 1526
SPONSORED BY Representatives Frost, Carson, Davis, Elder, Harlan, Lee
Johnson, Packwood, Skelton, Wilson (at the request of the Oregon Conference
on Bail and Criminal Justice)
SUMMARY
Provides for discretionary use by peace officer of written notice to appear in
court in lieu of immediate incarceration and appearance before a magistrate, in




Relating to procedures prior and subsequent to arrest and before examination;
and providing penalties.
Be It Enacted by the People of the State of Oregon:
SECTION 1. In any case in which a person is subject to arrest for a felony,
misdemeanor, or violation of municipal or county ordinance, and does not desire
to be taken before a magistrate pursuant to ORS 133.520, any peace officer may
instead of taking the person before the magistrate, whether or not an arrest is
made, issue a written notice to appear in court in accordance with the following
provisions:
(1) The written notice to appear in court shall contain the name and address
of the person, the offense charged, and the time and place when and where the
person shall appear in court. The place specified in the notice shall be the court
of the magistrate before whom the person would be taken pursuant to ORS 133.520.
(2) The officer shall deliver one copy of the notice to appear to the arrested
person, and the arrested person, in order to secure release, must give his written
promise to so appear in court by signing a duplicate notice which shall be furnished
by the officer. Thereupon the officer shall release the arrested person from custody.
(3) The officer shall, as soon as practicable, file the duplicate notice with the
magistrate specified therein.
SECTION 2. If the person fails to appear at the time and place specified in
the notice, the magistrate may issue a warrant for his arrest.
SECTION 3. It is unlawful for any person receiving the notice mentioned in
section 1 of this Act not to appear on the day named and at the hour specified.
Wilful violation of this section is punishable, in addition to the punishment for
the violation for which the notice was issued, upon conviction as follows:
(1) If the notice was issued for a felony offense then by imprisonment in the
State Penitentiary for not more than two years or by imprisonment in the county
jail for not more than one year or by a fine not exceeding $100;
(2) If the notice was issued for a misdemeanor offense then by imprisonment
in the county jail for not more than one year, or by fine of not more than $500,
or both;
(3) If the notice was issued for violation of a county ordinance, then by im-
prisonment in the county jail for not more than six months or by fine not exceeding
$500;
(4) If the notice was issued for violation of a municipal ordinance, then by
imprisonment in the city jail for not more than six months or by fine not exceeding
$500.
SECTION 4. This Act shall not apply to traffic offenses specified in ORS
484.010, or game law violations specified in ORS 496.645.
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